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Parent.Child Tort Actions
Richard W. Dunn*
T HE RULE IN ALL STATES that have heard such actions is that
an unemancipated child cannot sue his parent for a negli-
gent tort in their ordinary family relationships.' There does not
appear to be any exception to that rule, unless the "business-
injury" rule (discussed below) is an exception.
It is the opinion of this writer that this iron rule is archaic
and should be changed. A total stranger may recover damages
for the negligent act of a person who may be a parent, yet that
same parent's own child may not recover.
As has been said so many times in court opinions dealing
with parent-child tort actions, parental authority must not be
undermined; the calm waters of the family pond must not be
stirred. Defense attorneys and insurance companies, in the main,
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lead in defending this rule. Their reasons seem superficially
sound and, when presented, appeal to the natural instinct to pre-
serve the family.
A dissenting opinion by Justice Fuld in a recent New York
decision,2 however, gives pause to anyone who considers the
soundness of the old rule. Judge Fuld called for the abolition of
the rule in automobile negligence cases only, not general aboli-
tion. The writer is in full agreement, feeling that a mother or
father should not be liable for accidents in the home, nor at the
summer cottage, nor in any other place where the family is func-
tioning as a unit.
Reasons For the Rule
In the first American parent-child tort suit, in 1871, 3 a Missis-
sippi Court, without any precedent to guide it, decided that pub-
lic policy and the peace of society forbade such an action. In
1871 that reasoning probably was correct. Subsequent decisions
in parent-child suits followed the HewlettO decision, and in time
expanded the reasons for parental immunity. The arguments of
domestic harmony, public policy, and parental authority, all
sounded righteous enough. As time passed and liability insurance
became more prevalent, cries of collusion and fraud were added
to those already mentioned. Yet the rationale for all these argu-
ments sometimes has been set aside where there is an intra-family
suit involving other than a parent and child,5 or where the acci-
dent occurred as a result of willful and wanton misconduct on
the part of the defendant-parent. 6
In a recent Virginia7 case the plaintiff, 13 years old, a pas-
senger in the car of his 17 year old brother, sued for injuries
sustained as a result of the older brother's negligence. The court,
in finding for the plaintiff, was unimpressed by defense coun-
sel's arguments regarding family immunity. It said that the im-
munity extended only between a husband and wife or a parent
and an unemancipated child. No doubt there was liability in-
2 Badigan v. Badigan, 9 N. Y. 2d 472, 174 N. E. 2d 718 (1961).
3 Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 S. 885, 13 A. L. R. 682 (1891).
4 Ibid.
5 Spaulding v. Mineah, 239 App. Div. 460, 268 N. Y. S. 772 (1933); Fox v.
Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P. 2d 252 (1956).
6 Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595 (1949), affd. 276
App. Div. 972, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 620.
7 Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S. E. 2d 875, 81 A. L. R. 2d 1150 (1960).
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surance involved. When questions were raised by the defense
regarding fraud and collusion, the court said that fraud was
never presumed, and that courts should not immunize all tort-
feasors because of the possibility of fraud or collusion. The court
indicated that the decision was primarily based on the common
law right of a minor to sue. Following the same reasoning, a Cali-
fornia court allowed two sisters to sue their brother when they
were injured as a result of his reckless driving.S It logically fol-
lows that this same argument should be similarly applied in a
parent-child suit.
Development of Litigation Between Spouses
Spousal immunity in tort actions has been an area of liti-
gation similar to the subject matter of this article. Until the
middle of the nineteenth century, a wife, unequivocally, could
not sue her husband in tort. The Emancipation Acts, passed about
1844, were the first stepping stones towards the wife's right to
sue her husband. A substantial minority of states now allow one
spouse to sue the other for personal injuries.9
Legislation in New York expressly permits such suits.10 With
the argument of domestic peace losing its appeal in husband-wife
tort actions in a growing minority of jurisdictions, it follows that
it should only be a matter of time before the same rationale will
be applied to parent-child suits.
Suits Against Parent in Business Capacity
There is a small, but conspicuous number of decisions that
have permitted the parent to be sued in his business capacity.
In a recent Ohio case," the plaintiff, a minor child, was injured
and sued a partnership comprised of his father and another per-
son. The court held that the immunity did not exist when the
tort was committed in a non-parental transaction. In like man-
8 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218 (1955).
9 Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P. 2d 696 (1954); Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Jacek, 156 F. Supp. 43 (D. C., N. J. 1957) (Applying N. Y. law); Leach v.
Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S. W. 2d 15 (1957); Lowman v. Lowman, 166 Ohio
St. 1, 139 N. E. 2d 1 (1956); Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis. 14, 53 N. W. 2d 740
(1952).
10 N. Y. Dom. Rel. L., Sec. 57.
11 Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N. E. 2d 743 (1952).
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ner, New Hampshire,'12 Washington, 13 West Virginia, 4 Virginia,15
and most recently Coloradosa have allowed suits by the injured
child, holding the parent not immune when sued in his business
or vocational capacity. These same states, in other suits between
a parent and child, have not allowed the suit where the tort was
committed within the family relationship. 16 The line drawn be-
tween the two types of suits seems very thin.
A father is a father whether he is a factory worker and
backs over a child in his driveway, or whether he is the owner
of a store and negligently lets a stack of canned goods fall on his
child. In either situation the child owes the parent the same
filial devotion. Parental authority cannot be destroyed by a
partnership agreement nor by articles of incorporation, yet it ap-
pears that these documents are sufficient in some jurisdictions to
remove the cloak of family immunity from the shoulders of the
parent. In the cases allowing the suit it appears that the courts
did what they thought was equitable, and circumvented the par-
ent's immunity via the business capacity avenue.
Judge Fuld, in his dissent in the Badigan case, 17 raised a
very interesting and pertinent point. He stated that the Biblical
command, "Honor thy father and thy mother" did not cease when
a child attained his majority or became emancipated. He cited
in his dissent only a few of the decisions' 8 that have allowed
suits by emancipated children or by children who have attained
their majority. How can the courts reason that a child of tender
years should be denied the right allowed to an older brother or
sister who no longer is at home? Does the love or filial tie of a
child to a parent lessen with the passage of time? I think not!
Surely an older child is in a position to see and realize how much
his parent has done for him, and comprehends matters of which
12 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
13 Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149 (1952).
14 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932).
15 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d 343 (1939).
15a Trevarton v. Trevarton, 378 P. 2d 640 (Colo. 1963).
16 Canen v. Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N. E. 277 (1931); Worrell v. Moran,
supra, n. 1; Brumfield v. Brumfield, supra, n. 1; Securo v. Securo, supra,
n. 1; De Lay v. De Lay, supra, n. 1.
17 Badigan v. Badigan, supra, n. 2.
18 Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A. 2d 586 (1948); Taubert v. Taubert,
103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763 (1908); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 213 Miss. 536,
57 S. 2d 302 (1952); Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wis. 662, 271 N. W. 374
(1937).
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a child of tender years has no understanding, yet the suits by
emancipated children and by children who have maintained their
majority are permitted.
Dissenting Opinions and Views on the Child's Right
In dissenting opinions, where courts have disallowed the suit
of the injured minor, the judges have come forth with some log-
ical and powerful arguments. Judge Fuld's dissent' is almost, in
and of itself, an exhaustive treatise on the subject. He analyzes
each "legal sanctuary" of the parent, and then proceeds with
pragmatic reasoning and sound legal theory to dissolve the walls
of protection. He contended that the doctrine of family immunity
was wrong in principle and at odds with justice and the realities
of the era in which we live. He stated that there had been many
exceptions and qualifications to the rule, and thus the rule was
weakened, if not completely consumed, by these exceptions. Al-
though the fact that insurance may be present in a case does not
create liability, by the same token that same insurance, the judge
argued, should not be used as a tool to deprive the injured child
of his legal right.
Judge Jacobs, forcefully dissenting in a New Jersey case,20
said that insurance in the home or in the car should extend either
to the wife or child, and thus family harmony would be assured
instead of being disrupted. He indicated that the possibility of
fraud would be no greater than would exist between that same
parent and his adult friends. In New York,2 ' in a suit by a
brother against a sister, Judge Rippey, dissenting, said that if the
suit is sufficient to tear apart the family unit, then that which
binds together the family unit is a slender thread. In a 1924 Cana-
dian2 2 case the court said:
However repugnant it may seem that a minor child should
sue his own father, it is equally repugnant that a child in-
jured by his parent's negligent act, perhaps maimed for life,
should have no redress for the injury he has suffered.
Wrongful Death Actions
In actions for wrongful death, decisions conflict; however,
the majority do not allow the suit. In those cases where the suit
19 Badigan v. Badigan, supra, n. 2.
20 Hastings v. Hastings, supra, n. 1.
21 Rozel v. Rozel, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 254, 123 A. L. R. 1015 (1939).
22 Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Marshland, Can. S. C. 86, 4 D. L. R. 157, 13
B. R. C. 1135, 19 A. L. R. 2d 442 (1924).
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
has been allowed,2 3 generally involving willful and wanton mis-
conduct on the part of defendant-parent, the courts have stated
that by the negligent act which caused the death of the child, the
parent-child relationship was destroyed and the suit could be
maintained. In a strongly worded dissent in a New York case,24
Judge Schwartzwald stated that the common law could not hope
to survive by stubborn adherence to decisions written for a dif-
ferent world. He said that Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century
rules could not and should not be applied to Twentieth Cen-
tury conditions. In those jurisdictions where wrongful death ac-
tions by an unemancipated child are not allowed, the courts
strictly construe the wrongful death statute and say that had
the child survived the suit could not have been maintained.25
In Kentucky,26 in 1961, a wrongful death action was brought
in the deceased infant's behalf. The court allowed the suit and
indicated that the family relationship would not be disrupted
where the child was no longer alive. It certainly appears that
there is a strong trend, which should shortly attain majority
status, that where the parent is guilty of willful misconduct and
causes injury or death to the child there is complete abandon-
ment of the parental immunity.
Insurance Problems
The main issue in many of the parent-child suits is the in-
volvement of insurance. Defense attorneys argue that when there
is an intra-family suit, the jury surely suspects the presence of
liability insurance. The public has become more and more aware
of insurance. Juries certainly are intelligent enough to know
that insurance is often involved; yet, its presence seems hardly
adequate reason to deny the suit. Insurance companies can in-
crease their premiums, or by exclusion not extend coverage to
a loss involving a member of the household. New York has
passed legislation27 which provides that liability insurance will
23 Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S. W. 2d 610 (1950); Cowgill v. Brock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445, 19 A. L. R. 2d 405 (1950); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71
N. J. S. 294, 176 A. 2d 818 (1962); Decker v. Decker, 20 Misc. 2d 438, 193
N. Y. S. 2d 431 (1959).
24 Henderson v. Henderson, 11 Misc. 2d 449, 169 N. Y. S. 2d 106 (1957).
25 Owens v. Auto. Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 S. 133 (1937); Cronin
v. Cronin, 244 Wis. 372, 12 N. W. 2d 677 (1944).
26 Harlan National Bank v. Gross, 346 S. W. 2d 482 (Ky., 1961).
27 N. Y. Ins. L., Sec. 167 (3).
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not extend to a spouse for injury or property damage, unless
the contrary is stated in the policy. Legislators could get the
pulse of their constituents and pass appropriate acts to cover
parent-child suits. Allowing suits by children against parents
would not perpetrate fraud nor bring about frivolous law suits.
If it did, the insurance companies and/or legislators could act to
create the safeguards they deemed necessary. If it did, surely
the courts and the juries would be intelligent enough to com-
prehend the obvious and take the necessary action to discourage
fraudulent claims. In any event the tide must turn, and only
when it does will the problems that arise be dealt with.
Summary
The rule in the Hewlett decision 28 should be abrogated.
When the reason for a rule ceases to exist, the rule should cease
to exist. A decision rendered in 1871 should not blindly control
the rights of an injured child almost a century later. The dis-
senting opinions of today will grow until they become the ma-
jority. Until that time the injured child will go uncompensated.
When the injuries are severe the monetary drain alone will se-
verely disrupt the serenity of the family. All parents pray that
they never injure their children by an act of simple negligence.
The grief attendant on such an act, coupled with the financial
obligations that may result, are sufficient to completely alter the
lives of the entire family. Children are struck down with crip-
pling and killing diseases that alone are enough to try the souls
of parents. Why should a similar burden be on a parent when
he negligently injures his child with his car? We do not believe
that public policy, family tranquillity, parental authority, nor any
of the other long argued defenses that have been raised should
deprive a child of an inherent right to be justly dealt with and
fairly compensated for his injury.
This is a problem that courts, lawyers, juries, legislators, in-
surance companies and the public cannot forever avoid. In an-
cient times (and the practice still exists in some primitive so-
cieties) a father could sell his child into slavery, or for that
matter offer him in sacrifice, if he chose to do so, but the laws
corrected those injustices and just as surely will make more
reasonable the position of the injured-unemancipated child.
28 Hewlett v. George, supra, n. 3.
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In conclusion, reference is once again made to the words of
Judge Fuld,29
The law does not deliberately carve an exception in favor of
parents, out of the right of a minor child to be secure from
negligent harm to his person.
This means, to the writer, that my child is entitled at least
to that to which a total stranger is entitled from me.
29 Badigan v. Badigan, supra, n. 2.
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